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Shannon Stormont 
Chapter 1—Hartford Schools: An Introduction 
 
 Connecticut’s capital city of Hartford is a struggling city in the center of a 
thriving metropolitan region. While Hartford was recently ranked among the ten poorest 
cities in the nation, the Hartford Metropolitan Region, consisting of numerous towns to 
the south of Hartford including Middletown, was ranked as the country’s ninth most 
affluent region. While many refer to the Hartford Metropolitan Region as a community, 
this sharp divide in resources and wealth among the towns that comprise the area point to 
a deep contrast of social, political and economic origin. As Michael Carbone, Hartford’s 
former Deputy Mayor, pointed out, Hartford has long been two distinct cities, “a city of 
the highway that the commuter sees and uses and the city of the neighborhoods in which 
people live” (Hartford Primer, 2001).  
 Hartford’s population has rapidly declined over the last several decades, from 
over 170,000 people fifty years ago to about 120,000 today. For those residents that 
remain, poverty is rampant; Hartford had a per capita income of less than $15,000 in 
1998. This low income level is due, in part, to a large pool of unskilled laborers and a 
lack of industry for their services. In addition, half of Hartford’s high school students 
never graduate. One explanation for the high drop-out rates is the cities high teenage 
pregnancy rate—25% of births in Hartford in 1998 were to teenage mothers. The high 
drop-out rates are only one of a number of problems that plague Hartford schools, one of 
the most prominent of which is the racial segregation, as demonstrated by the Sheff v. 
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O’Neill case filed in 1988 on behalf of seventeen Hartford school children (Hartford 
Primer, 2001).  
 In this study I will examine the governance structure of Hartford schools, 
focusing specifically on the relationship between the elected school board, the 
superintendent, and the parents of Hartford school children. I will discuss different 
parental involvement strategies employed by each of the many administrations of the past 
decade and attempt to draw broader conclusions based on categorizations of governance 
structure. In order to come to these broader conclusions I will categorize based on the 
three main structures: City Control (Pre-1994), Private Control (1994-1996), and State 
Control (1996-Present).  
By examining the history of the Hartford schools and the basic policy strategies of 
the city, private, and state-run administrations, I hope to paint a picture of the chaos and 
inefficiency which has plagued Hartford schools throughout each administration. This 
information will allow for the comparison of each administration and the critique of 
various school policies and practices, both effective and ineffective. In addition, I will 
compare test scores and interviews to assess student success, as typically defined by the 
number of students performing at or above grade- level and drop-out rates. While this may 
not be an accurate measure of how much students are learning, standardized testing is 
currently the most widely accepted standard by which student success is judged.  
In addition to examining student success under various administrations, my thesis 
will also use interviews and primary sources to determine the extent to which each 
administration attempted to involve parents in the schools, leading to further conclusions 
about the power structure and the extent to which each administration was democratic. 
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While many claims have been made that parental involvement impacts student success, I 
plan to assess whether or not this has been the case in Hartford, or whether there is 
current ly enough basis for judgment.  
The study of the turbulent history of the Hartford schools and various governance 
structures and policies will allow policy-makers to focus their methods of improving 
student’s educational experiences. As Hartford faces yet another upcoming change in 
administration and governance structure when control is handed back to the city in 
December of 2002, I plan to use the information I have gathered to predict whether or not 
the transition back to city control will be detrimental to student success and propose 
certain strategies for avoiding educational setbacks. The successes and failures of past 
administrations, coupled with the existing literature on the subject, will contribute to my 
analysis of the strategies employed to involve parents and improve student success. This 
analysis, in turn, will allow me to develop recommendations as to the most effective and 
successful policies and those which administrators should consider in the future.  
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Shannon Stormont 
Chapter 2—Hartford’s City School Board—Failing the Children? 
 
 “Across this Nation, we must cultivate communities where children can 
learn…Where the school is a living center of a community where people care—people 
care for each other and their futures. Not just in the school but in the neighborhood. Not 
just in the classroom, but in the home” (Coleman, 1991). While President Bush was 
making these bold declarations about the future of our schools in 1991, Hartford schools 
were experiencing tumultuous events, due to frequent changes in the administrative 
control of the schools. Along with shifts in governance structure came changing ideas for 
reform, sending students and parents on a whirlwind of reform initiatives that barely 
lasted long enough to evaluate their effectiveness. It is no wonder that students’ 
educational achievement suffered as a result. 
 In this chapter I will explore a number of challenges Hartford schools faced from 
the period of 1990 until 1994, leading up to the hiring of a private for-profit management 
firm, Education Alternative Inc., in 1994. The most visible issue Hartford faced was the 
case of Sheff v. O’Neil, which involved a lawsuit brought by seventeen Hartford children 
in 1989. The children claimed to have been denied an equal education to their suburban 
counterparts because of residential segregation. In 1994, the state Superior Court ruled 
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the state was responsible for the segregation of 
the Hartford schools. This decision was overruled in 1996 by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, which found that the Hartford schools failed to provide the equal educational 
opportunity guaranteed in the state constitution (Hartford Primer).  
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 Administrators grappled with the desegregation ordered by Sheff and the low 
educational achievement that was becoming increasingly apparent with the growing 
emphasis on standardized tests. T. Josiha Haig was hired as superintendent in July 1991 
by the Hartford Board of Education on a three-year contract. (Hartford Courant, July 3, 
1994). Haig replaced Herman LaFontaine, who served as superintendent for twelve years 
and resigned citing a tight fiscal climate in the city and the demands of overseeing an 
urban school district. Haig, a successful black superintendent, brought great promise for 
reform to Hartford schools; in his six years as head of schools in East Orange, New 
Jersey he had taken a system that had failed to win certification in almost every area and 
turned it around. (Halloran, July 3, 1994). In August of 1991, Haig began his work and, 
on his first day on the job, met with staff and banished memos, cabinet meetings, and 
created rules forbidding employees from speaking with him without going through the 
chain of command. In October, Haig protested the city’s contract with Vancom Inc., a 
bus company that was providing poor service to special education children. Haig stood 
outside of city hall in protest from 10 pm to 3:45 a.m., when the city agreed to review 
Vancom’s contract. Hartford school board President Ruthie B. Mathews praised Haig, 
saying, “He is not breaking a law; he is standing by his convictions to make sure that 
children’s interests come first. Those of us who are aware should join Dr. Haig” (Adams, 
Hartford Courant, October 5, 1991).  
Haig’s supporters speculated that Haig staged such dramas to draw attention to 
the school system’s problems in order to rally community concern and support. By June 
1992, Haig faced $8.5 million in budget cuts  (Green, Hartford Courant, June 5, 1992) 
and called for teachers to give up contractual raises, offering to cut his own salary by 
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45% and threatening to resign if even one teacher was laid off. Haig also said that 
teachers “don’t care” because they had refused to give back their negotiated 4 percent 
raise to prevent some layoffs, a comment which prompted a 600 person rally in front of 
the school board offices and an apology from Haig (Green, Hartford Courant, June 5, 
1992).  
While teachers were skeptical of Haig and his appeal to them to trust him, parents 
overwhelmingly supported him (Green, Hartford Courant, June 5, 1992). At this point the 
nine elected school board members were also behind Haig—most agreed that the 
projected layoffs of about 160 teachers would decimate the already struggling school 
system. While Haig was awarded a “Very good” rating by the Hartford Board of 
Education after one year in office, problems began to surface between him and board 
members (Green, Hartford Courant, November 18, 1992) and, as another budget crisis 
arose and the prospect of 300 teacher layoffs loomed, the board remained critical. In July 
1993, Haig’s name appeared on a list of candidates for the job of running New York City 
schools, and in October 1993, two years after taking office, Haig received a “satisfactory” 
or “C” grade for his second year on the job. The school board, which was looking for a 
dramatic increase in student performance on state mastery tests, remained disappointed 
with student performance and blamed Haig. On January 18, 1994 the board voted 5-4 not 
to renew Haig’s contract and Haig left office on June 30, 1994. (Hartford Courant, July 3, 
1994).  
 Looking at Haig’s three years in office in terms of parental and community 
involvement, it seems that Haig managed to impress parents and students while alienating 
board members and teachers. One board member said that, of Hartford’s many 
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superintendents in the 90s,  “Probably the person who distinguished himself the most as a 
friend of parents was a man named Josiha Haig” (Interview #2).  He outlined plans to set 
goals for student achievement, parental involvement, and teacher effectiveness, many of 
which he presented as strategic goals to the board before September of 1993 and were not 
approved until June of 1994, his last month in office (Hartford Courant, July 9, 1994). 
Haig also hosted informal meetings with residents and parents and succeeded in merging 
several parents groups into one organization, Together We Can. Haig also worked hard to 
establish a program with area colleges that would help public school students go on to 
higher education. As Shirley West, co-chairwoman of Together We Can, pointed out, 
“his biggest mistake was when he began to let parents really know what was happening 
in the school system. His honesty sealed his doom” (Halloran, July 3, 1994). As Merline 
Clark, President of the Parent Teacher Organization at Annie Fisher School put it, “The 
parents look at it as a man who at least outwardly is willing to take a stand” (Green, 
Hartford Courant, June 5, 1992).  
In fact, during February and March of 1994 parents and guardians were surveyed 
on their involvement in their 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, or 10th grade child’s education. This survey 
appeared in the 1993-1994 annual report to the Connecticut State Department Board of 
Education, the only survey of its kind or mention of parental involvement to appear in the 
annual reports dating from the 1993-1994 school year through the 2000-2001 school 
year, demonstrating Haig’s commitment to focusing on parental involvement. Of the 
surveys returned, 23.2% of parents/guardians of students in Hartford schools volunteered 
to help out with school-sponsored activities “frequently” or “almost always”, compared 
with the 26.4% of parents of students across the state. This relatively small discrepancy 
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between parents of Hartford students and students in other school districts is echoed 
across most of the questions. For example, 63.7% of respondents in Hartford claimed to 
“frequently” or “almost always” help their child with his/her homework, compared with 
55.6% of state-wide respondents. Similar results were found for percentage of parents 
that “frequently” or “almost always” checked to see if their child’s homework was 
complete (89.2% of Hartford respondents compared to 83.3% statewide), who tried to 
make sure their child was prepared for classwork (90.6% of Hartford respondents 
compared to 91.6% statewide), and who took an active part in the activities of a parent’s 
group at the school (24.1% Hartford respondents compared to 24.4% statewide). The 
shocking result, however, comes when comparing the percentage of parents who the 
school open house (parent’s night)—only 44.4% of Hartford parents/guardians attend 
compared to 83% statewide. (Strategic School District Profile, 1993-1994). When faced 
with these seemingly involved parents, one must then question the reason for this very 
large discrepancy in terms of Open House attendance.  
 One answer may point to the difference in percentage of surveys returned—20.9% 
in Hartford and 41.7% statewide. This discrepancy most- likely demonstrates that the 
most involved parents are the ones returning the surveys, particularly in Hartford, where 
only slightly more than 1/5 were returned. Given this fact, it is still remarkable, however, 
that of these most involved parents, who are otherwise comparable to the average parent 
statewide, so few (44.4%) attended the school Open House (Strategic School District 
Profile, 1993-1994). These discrepancies can be characterized as individual versus 
collective participation. Individualistic participation involves parent energies that are 
targeted directly at their own children while collaborative participation involves the 
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harmony of parents’ goal and activities with those of others within the local education 
community, such as teachers, parents, and administrators (Henig, 158). Parents in 
Hartford seem to be involved in individualistic participation such as helping children with 
their homework, rather than collective participation, such as encouraging reforms in the 
broader school system. The strongest empirical research linking parental involvement to 
educational success points towards the importance of individualized family support, 
which correlates to socioeconomic class, particularly parents’ level of education, which 
tends to be particularly low in Hartford (Henig, 158). In 1997, the city of Hartford had 
the highest teen birth rate in the nation with 114 births per 1000 teens (Report to the 
CETC Youth Committee, Teen Parents and School Dropouts, 2001) and roughly 41% of 
Hartford’s adult population could read only at Level 1, which is characterized by the 
inability to fill out a form, read a food label, or read a simply story to a child (Hartford 
Primer).  
In order to be fully effective, an urban school district’s attempt to truly involve 
parents into their child’s educational experience must take these factors into account. In 
terms of educational reform, parental support, or lack thereof, often determines whether 
or not the reform is successful. Oftentimes, collective involvement provides the greatest 
benefits to those students whose parents are not involved on an individualized level. This 
benefit, while constituting a public good, also helps to explain the difficulty of 
maintaining collective involvement of parents because, assuming that parents are rational 
and self- interested, their time is better spent devoted to the improvement of their own 
child’s educational experience. From a community standpoint, this systemic approach to 
reform through collective involvement is beneficial for the city as a whole. By helping 
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those students whose families cannot help them, parents who tend to have the greatest 
inclination and ability to participate improve their children’s education by bolstering the 
city’s educational system rather than by taking their energy to the surrounding suburban 
schools (Henig, US Department of Education, 1996).  
 An interview with one Hartford Organizer reveals the state of the Hartford 
schools during this period. She points out that in 1994 schools did not even have the tools 
necessary to teach: 
They literally didn’t even have books. You would have a math class with 
one book, maybe two books. Literally, no books for the children. Teachers 
had to do those mimeograph things and they mostly had to pay for them 
themselves (Interview #1). 
 
The state of disarray of the schools accounts, in part, for the poor student performance. 
District-wide, 12.3% of students performed at or above the state goal in reading, 
compared to 53.4% state-wide. In writing, 10.9% of the district performed at or above 
state goal, compared to 34.2% of students state-wide. Math scores reflected similar 
results; 8.4% of Hartford students met or surpassed state goals compared to 48.3% of 
students across Connecticut. While one must recognize that these results are based on the 
Connecticut Mastery Test, which is not immune to standardized test bias, which tends to 
favor white, suburban students, these scores serve as further evidence that education in 
Hartford was severely inadequate. In addition, only 23.4% of boys and 11.4% of girls 
passed four physical fitness tests, as compared to 30.2% and 22.2% of students statewide. 
Similar inadequacies are reflected in dropout rates; from the fall of 1992 to 1993, 17.1% 
of Hartford students dropped out compared to 4.6% state-wide. Student attendance can 
also serve as an indicator of student success. While Hartford elementary students 
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demonstrated similar attendance patterns to those observed state-wide (92.3% to 95.7%), 
high school attendance rates showed a more dramatic difference (81.4% to 92.6%). In 
addition, only 33.7% of Hartford’s high school graduates went on to pursue degrees from 
four-year colleges, compared to 53.9% of students state-wide. Scholastic Achievement 
Test (SAT) scores were similarly below-par; the average verbal score of Hartford 
students was 315 and math score was 353, compared to 423 and 467 state-wide (Strategic 
School District Profile, 1993-1994).  
The fact that Haig’s contractual negotiations were left entirely to the board to 
decide makes a closer look at the make-up of this board integral. The board was 
comprised of nine members, roughly 2/3 of whom were parents. When questioned about 
parental response to the decision not to renew Haig’s contract, one member of the board 
who served during Haig’s administration said that, “I think that by the time that his 
contract was ending, I think most people, including parents, had determined that he 
probably was not the strongest choice for superintendent” (Interview #2). The 5-4 
decision not to renew Haig’s contract, however, was reflective of deeper divisions among 
board members. Relations between board members were fragmented, resulting in small 
factions within the nine person group. When asked about these factions, one board 
member classified them as:  
Those who wanted to bring about change versus those who wanted to bring about 
the status quo. But probably more fairly, everyone was trying to bring about 
change and everyone was concerned about result. I think that the factions 
generally were created because different groups had different ideas on the kind of 
changes that were required and the strategies needed to implement those changes. 
(Interview #2). 
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 While Haig worked to combine parent groups into one group, Together We Can, 
parent organizing in Hartford never seemed to take off. As one Community Organizer 
said of Haig, “He tried to get parent stuff going. The fundamental question about 
mobilizing parents is who should do it” (Interview #1). This fundamental question of who 
should be responsible for organizing and involving parents seems to point to many 
different answers, including parents, school board members, and the Superintendent’s 
Office. One must examine the source of support for parent organizing and consider their 
agenda and its influence on reform, keeping in mind that “the impulse to reform may 
come from pubic officials and civic leaders (top-down) or from grassroots community 
pressure (bottom-up), but it is likely that sustained and effective reformed efforts require 
a little of both” (Henig, 189).  Research has pointed to the importance of viewing 
educational leadership as a process that involves leaders, teachers, students, parents, and 
community members.  
While Haig was taking small steps towards involving parents in their children’s 
education, among school board members “there was a strong belief that parents needed to 
be involved in the educational process in order for schools to work” (Interview #2). 
When further examining this belief, it seems that the board emphasized parental 
involvement on paper while doing little to actually encourage parental involvement or 
discourage it. As one board member points out: 
Both in the long range strategic plans of the entire school district as well 
as in the site based school improvement plans that got developed, there 
was a heavy emphasis on having significant parent involvement. Beyond 
that, our meetings were not only open to the public but we encouraged a 
lot of public discussion both at the board level and in the board 
committees as well (Interview #2).  
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While these meetings were open to parents, little was done to recruit or involve parents, 
beyond those who were elected members of the school board. One effort involved a 
Parent Leadership Training Institute offered by Leadership Greater Hartford, which 
trained three parents who, with the training and support provided them, ran for and got 
elected to the school board (Interview #2). While this was a small-scale effort to involve 
parents, it centers on the role of the school board and its power rather than parents and 
their power. The school board’s lack of an attempt to grant parents a role in the process, 
despite Haig’s apparent interest in involving parents, points to a lack of communication 
and cooperation between the school board and the Superintendent’s Office, which could 
account for the ineffectiveness of Haig’s attempts to involve parents. Policy leaders have 
pointed to the importance of communication between the superintendent and school 
board, arguing that “a superintendent must understand the board members’ views and be 
able to work with the board to pursue a common vision for the district” (U.S. Department 
of Education, 1999). While Haig may have been trying to balance the bottom-up and top-
down notions of reform, Haig’s inability to involve the powerful school board in these 
reforms may have also led to his ultimate dismissal and the subsequent failure of his 
reforms to have any real impact.  
The school model at this time reflected a strong school board/weak superintendent 
model, a result of a combination of “a leadership vacuum in the Superintendent’s Office 
[and] people’s individual styles of governance” (Interview #2). This school-board 
centered model makes the examination of school board policies and goals equally 
important to the examination of the superintendent’s policies and goals. While the 
superintendent is the “highly visible figure on the front lines of education who articulates 
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the vision for and oversees the activities of a large organization…school board members 
set the policies that make or break the achievements of other leaders and teachers” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 1999). The school board members “have considerable power 
over the things that matter in a local school system, but often they are the leaders who 
have the least formal training for their roles” (U.S. Department of Education, 1999), 
complicating the issue of accountability. While school board members “felt accountable 
to students, their families, and the voters of Hartford primarily” (Interview #2), in terms 
of parental involvement “some people were probably more serious about [it] than others” 
(Interview #2). Parental involvement, however important, often seemed to fall behind 
more pressing concerns such as failing buildings, and lack of supplies. School board 
members set out “to reform the school system in a way that would bring about far better 
academic success for children and do it in a way that was fiscally responsible and in a 
way that would produce sustainable results” (Interview #2), a tall task for a board faced 
with limited resources and growing problems.  
After Haig’s contract expired, Eddie Davis, Principal of Weaver High School, 
was named as acting superintendent on a one-year contract. The board decided to hire 
Davis and wait to look for a permanent successor so that they could focus their energy on 
working with Education Alternatives Inc., a process that could be considered 
undemocratic because of the lack of community input. Under state law, the board could, 
with the approval of the State Education Commissioner, appoint an acting superintendent 
for a period not to exceed 90 days but multiple 90-day extensions could be granted for 
good cause so long as the board reported their progress on superintendent searches. 
(Halloran, November 3, 1994). At this point Hartford was exploring the option of 
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bringing in private employees to serve as teachers, social workers, and psychologists, an 
idea that eventually grew to include administrators and the hiring of Education 
Alternatives Inc. (EAI) in 1994. In “an era of increased expectations with diminishing 
resources to meet those expectations” (Interview #2), EAI seemed like an innovative 
alternative and the only chance for Hartford’s failing schools. Davis’ appointment would 
signal the beginning of the hiring of EAI. and the subsequent long string of temporary 
superintendents that followed.  
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Shannon Stormont 
Chapter 3—EAI: Privatizing a Public Service 
 
 The overarching debate over the merits of private control of public schools has 
been reenacted in struggling education systems across the country for years. Advocates 
argue that underperforming schools should be handed over to nongovernment authorities, 
either for-profit or not- for-profit management firms. While public schools often contract 
with private firms for services like transportation, food, textbooks, maintenance, and 
professional development, advocates have wanted to extend private control by offering 
contracts to educational management organizations (EMOs) to operate the entire school. 
EMOs, once hired, would then have the power to hire and supervise staff and teachers, 
develop the curriculum, determine the organization of the schools, and assess student 
progress (Levin, 2001).  
As Hartford schools struggled to produce results, the idea of hiring a private 
company to run the schools surfaced. While several school systems, including Baltimore, 
had handed over several schools to for-profit management firms, no system had ever been 
entirely turned over, as was being proposed in Hartford. The front-runner in the pool of 
private firms was Education Alternatives Inc. (EAI), the leading private and for-profit 
school management company that claimed to be able to take over and make dramatic 
improvements (Green, Hartford Courant, July 23, 1994).  
While the school board ultimately had the role of deciding whether or not to hire 
EAI, a public battle waged between EAI supporters and teachers and staff in schools to 
win public support. Opponents argued that the schools should try again to reform from 
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within and that the lack of any documented improvements in other EAI schools raised 
doubts as to how EAI would make a profit in Hartford. EAI, however, had more to gain 
from signing Hartford than an immediate profit; a contract with Hartford schools would 
“provide a positive jolt to the company’s [already struggling] stock—possibly doubling 
its value” (Green, Courant, July 8, 1994). Experts believed that EAI could use Hartford 
schools to create a model school system to sell to districts across the country, worrying 
less about profit and more on improvements (Green, Hartford Courant, July 8, 1994). 
Opponents of EAI pointed to the Baltimore school system’s decision not to turn 
over more control until after improvements in the nine schools EAI managed had been 
assessed by an outside firm. They also pointed to the larger class size in EAI-run schools, 
the complete inclusion of special education students, and the replacement of all 
paraprofessionals with interns who received lower wages and no benefits. EAI’s main 
opponent was the Hartford Federation of Teacher (HFT), who threatened to challenge the 
legality of the process that led to EAI’s selection if they were hired. The National 
Education Association (NEA), the nation’s largest teachers union, also waged a war 
against privatization of schools through its Center for the Preservation of Public Schools. 
Judy Behnke, director of the Center, argued that schools “[are] not like General Motors. 
We cannot recall the child if the child has not been successful” (Frerking, The New York 
Times, July 24, 1996).  
 Parents, who  were left to sift through these muddled and conflicting reports, were 
left confused by it all. As Sara Oyola Bowman, principal of Sanchez School pointed out, 
“We hear EAI talking and saying one thing and we hear the unions talk, we hear 
something else…It’s confusing for parents and everyone” (Green, Hartford Courant, May 
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29, 1994). As one community organizer pointed out, as people began to debate 
privatization of schools “the whole issue there became not educational reform. It just got 
cut pro EAI and anti EAI. Most of the city council was pro” (Interview #1), as was 
demonstrated in their 6 to 3 vote to hand over control of all 32 Hartford schools to EAI 
on July 22, 1994 (Green, Courant, July 23, 1994). The board agreed to have EAI start 
work in the city’s schools by August 8th, and possibly as early as the following week. The 
decisions about how much EAI would be paid and exact limits on control were left up to 
a special contract negotiations committee.  
 The committee meetings resulted in a controversial contract giving EAI total 
control of the $200 million budget. The contract also put EAI in charge of recommending 
who to hire and/or fire and advising the board on union contract negotiations. Under the 
contract, the superintendent would remain in control and any disagreements between the 
superintendent and EAI would be resolved by the school board. EAI could also pay its 
operating costs out of the school budget and would receive a percentage of all money 
saved in running the schools. The contract, a five-year agreement, was subject to annual 
renewals and could be terminated at any time with 90 days written notice. EAI would 
also advance the city $20 million to install computers and upgrade city schools over five 
years and the city would repay the loan, with interest, over the life of the contract 
(Hartford Courant, September 27, 1994).  
 The contract was then to be voted on by the school board and the city council and 
signed by the city’s corporation counsel. The city council, maintaining some doubts about 
the contract, requested a delay on the vote, asking school board members to put off 
voting from Thursday, September 29, 1994 until Monday, October 3. Hartford’s 
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corporation counsel, Pedro Segarra, said that he would not sign the contract until a 
consensus had been reached between the school board and the city council and that he 
“would hope that the board of education would postpone taking action tomorrow” during 
their scheduled meeting (Green, Hartford Courant, September 29, 1994). Segarra, who 
signs all city contracts, went on to say that, “given the degree of differences that exist, 
absent a good degree of cooperation to make this contract work, I don’t know how I can 
say in good conscience that this contract is viable” (Green, Hartford Courant, September 
29, 1994). Despite his concerns and opposition from the city council that the contract 
granted EAI too much control over city funds, the board voted to hire EAI, resulting in a 
refusal by Segarra to sign the contract (The Baltimore Sun, October 4, 1994). 
 Segarra’s refusal to sign began another important struggle between the school 
board and the city council. While Mayor Michael Peters tried to broker a deal between 
the two, finance officials continued to say they wouldn’t process payments to EAI 
without Segarra’s signature. Finally, in October, city officials and EAI agreed on a 
contract under which the city would receive a share of any profits EAI were to make in 
Hartford (Hartford Courant, October 26, 1994).  
 As this contract became legally binding, new information began to surface. EAI, 
who took over control of nine Baltimore schools in 1992, announced in August of 1993 
that its 4,800 Baltimore students had gained nearly a full grade. Stock prices rose until 
ten months later when the Minneapolis Star Tribune published an expose revealing that 
the dramatic progress was limited to a small, unrepresentative group of students, and 
came not on citywide standardized tests but on an exam administered by an EAI 
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subcontractor. Instead, standardized reading and math scores went down during EAI’s 
first year (Kean, Newsday, October 31, 1994). 
 EAI seemed to redeem itself in June of 1994, in the heat of Hartford’s decision to 
hire them, when Baltimore’s education department announced that official standardized 
scores had improved for EAI’s second year. Then, in October, after contract negotiations 
were complete, an unusual clerical error was discovered and new scores were released 
showing a decline in reading and math scores in EAI schools once again. Ironically, the 
new scores also showed improvements in non-EAI run Baltimore schools, despite a lower 
per-pupil budget than the EAI schools (Kean, Newsday, October 31, 1994). Philip E. 
Geiger, divisional president for EAI, said, “I have no idea why the city [of Baltimore] 
issued one set of cores in June and one set of scores now. We are absolutely not involved 
in issuing those test results” (Green, Courant, October 19, 1994). Board members did not 
comment publicly on the scores, but Gregory A. Humphrey, Executive Assistant to the 
President of the teachers’ union, commented that, “The timing is very curious. When they 
released the scores in June, it was the height of the argument over the contract. Now, 
after the contract is signed, they release the [revised] information” (Green, Hartford 
Courant, October 19, 1994).  
 When determining the success of privatization, commonly used measures are 
student outcomes, costs, parental voice, accountability, and equity (Ascher, 1996). 
Educational outcomes are primarily measured by standardized test scores, especially 
because privatizers are interested in securing “quick, easily definable, and inexpensive 
measures of success” (Ascher, 1996). In Hartford, no stipulation was included in EAI’s 
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contract regarding test scores. EAI did, however, promise dramatic improvements over 
three years in student test scores.  
The issue of cost is also often associated with privatizing schools. Many urban 
education systems suffer lack of funds because of a funding system based on property-
based taxation, which creates drastic inequalities in school between property-poor and 
property-rich districts (Ascher, 1996). Due to increased state funding in Hartford, 
however, the amount per pupil per year exceeds the amount spent in many Connecticut 
suburbs. Despite these seemingly large resources, Hartford schools lack adequate 
buildings and supplies when compared to its suburban counterparts. As one former 
school board member pointed out: 
The state legislature, partly because all of the problems the Hartford 
schools were having, would approve these very big increases but then 
those dollars would be sent to city hall. The city council would take most 
of the additional dollars. Probably about 80% of the additional dollars that 
were given, were kept by the city and they used it for other city services 
and in some cases to give tax breaks to the taxpayers and only send us a 
fraction of what the state had recommended and intended (Interview #2).  
 
These problems with funding helped pave the way for the hiring of EAI and thus would 
be a main indicator of success. The profit EAI was able to make would be a prime 
indicator of its business potential and would thus be its main concern, along with an 
increase in test scores. One way to cut costs that is commonly associated with private 
management firms is the adaptation of the model used by Catholic schools, which have 
traditionally managed to maintain lower costs than public schools because of lower 
administrative expenses, narrower curriculum offerings, and much lower teacher salaries 
(Ascher, 1996).  
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Another measure of success in privatization is parental voice. Advocates of 
privatization often argue that parents want effective schools and that in a market-based 
system only effective schools will survive. This theory is most applicable under 
privatization attempts that involve school choice. It is argued that school choice gives 
parents power over their children’s education, however, others argue that “instead of 
helping to improve schools through their participation, dissatisfied parents are simply to 
take their children elsewhere” (Ascher, 1996), which does not really constitute true 
parental involvement. In the case of Hartford and EAI, parent choice was not involved in 
the contract, leaving “parental voice even more limited than in traditional public school 
systems” (Ascher, 1996).   
Another indicator of success in privatization is the level of accountability. “One 
of the central arguments advanced by privatizers is that public schools are unaccountable; 
that is, they are not effectively answerable to anyone—parents or taxpayers in general” 
(Ascher, 1996). This unaccountability is due, in large part, to a bureaucratic system that 
requires compromise between competing interests. Removing this level of bureaucracy is, 
in essence, removing the publicness from public schools by making schools more 
autocratic. A great deal of the bureaucratic accountability structure governing public 
schools was put in place to guarantee a level of equal opportunity, raising questions about 
how freeing schools from regulations affects the rights of students historically denied 
equal opportunity (Ascher, 1996). 
 Equity is another tool used to compare traditional public versus privatized 
schools. Although public schools are supposed to be equal because of universal access, 
academic achievement is often impacted by socioeconomic status, race, and gender. 
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Advocates of the privatization of public schools argue that equity-related objectives will 
be better maintained through free enterprise rather than government. Opponents, on the 
other hand, argue that equality is undermined by the desire to make a profit in privatized 
schools. One such example would be EAI’s decision in Baltimore to discard all special 
education programs in favor of complete inclusion in the classroom. One could argue that 
this decision favored the majority of students by shifting funds from special education 
programs to traditional classrooms at the expense of students in these programs, thus 
impeding these students’ ability to succeed in school. 
 When using these tools to analyze the success of EAI’s privatization attempt in 
Hartford, it is clear that privatization was not a clear solution. In December of 1994, EAI 
released a 100-day plan that promised to improve worker productivity, retrain employees, 
reorganize departments, retrofit schools, install new technology, and improve financial 
management (Green, Courant, December 7, 1994). EAI also outlined four key areas for 
improvement, none of which focused on improving parental involvement: financ ial; those 
related to non- instructional areas such as school maintenance; technological; and 
educational. Despite these claims, results in February, nearly four months after EAI was 
hired, were mixed. As one Hartford Courant article explained: 
Systemwide, there are some custodians who complain that they have not 
seen or heard from EAI, despite some dire shortages of supplies and calls 
for help; some parents and teachers say they have waited for EAI to reach 
out to them; most schools still await the new computer that EAI has said 
will help transform education in the city. But at some schools – and in 
some other key areas – EAI is making substantial progress, supporters and 
company officials says (Green, Hartford Courant, February 19, 1995).  
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In fact, EAI had only installed computers in 3 of 32 schools by February, leaving 29 
schools frustrated and beginning to doubt the promises made by EAI (Green, Hartford 
Courant, February 19, 1995). 
 EAI, who promised to increase parental involvement by March (Green, Courant, 
December 7, 1994), had shown little effort to involve parents by February. Cesar Mejia, 
president of the Spanish American Merchants Association, head of a parents’ advocacy 
group involved in 16 city schools, president of the Parkville Community School’ s parent-
teacher-community organization and a member of the school’s governance team, said that 
“They have not talked to me” (Green, Hartford Courant, February 19, 1995). Ana Velez, 
a member of the parent-teacher-community organization at Parkville echoed his 
sentiments when she declared that “Nobody knows the program” (Green, Hartford 
Courant, February 19, 1995). June Wilkins, project director for EAI, and EAI Chairman 
John T. Golle acknowledged that more needed to be done, pointing out that EAI had 
recent ly hired an outreach coordinator to work with parents and other community groups. 
At the same time, the school board directed acting Superintendent of Schools Eddie 
Davis, who had formerly discouraged the hiring of EAI, to work harder at getting 
information out about the partnership with EAI (Green, Hartford Courant, February 19, 
1995). The shifting of blame from EAI by parents to Davis by the board shows the lack 
of a sense of accountability, even under the privatization model. 
 The public perception of EAI’s success was only further confused as time passed. 
At a gathering marking EAI’s first 100 Days in Hartford, EAI supporters told their stories 
to members of Leadership Greater Hartford. Accomplishments at the schools that had 
seen the new computers were shared by members of the panel and the only person 
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representing doubt on the panel was Rawson School Principal Gerald Martin, who 
questioned EAI’s impact and claimed that “the communication level has been miserable 
as far as I’m concerned” (Green, Hartford Courant, March 7, 1995). No members of 
EAI’s staunchest opposition, the teachers union, were represented on the panel and 
criticism was kept to a minimum, despite EAI’s announcement that most schools would 
not receive computers by the end of the academic year (Green, Hartford Courant, March 
7, 1995). 
 Criticism grew quickly, however, and by May turmoil had ensued. EAI proposed 
laying off 300 teachers, a decision the school board was left to make. Meanwhile, the 
relationship between the board and acting Superintendent Davis deteriorated as Davis 
resisted EAI’s proposals to cut teachers and ignored school board recommended reforms 
in his own budget proposal. Shirley West, a parent activist who had initially opposed EAI 
and then supported it, seemed to raise the issue of clear accountability at a board meeting, 
saying, “I am sick and tired of people talking about money, money, money. For God’s 
sake quit putting the blame on everybody. I’m sick of it. I have seen so much insult going 
around” (Green, Hartford Courant, May 21, 1995). The school board was also receiving 
some of the blame with Stephanie Lightfoot, Thelma Dickerson, Candida Flores, and Ted 
Carroll, its members who staunchly supported EAI, being accused of selling out the 
school system to EAI in board meetings attracting hundreds of people. Others blamed the 
teacher’s union for encouraging teachers to speak about EAI in class (Green, Hartford 
Courant, May 21, 1995). 
 On May 23, 1995, a meeting was held at Bulkeley High School to try to begin 
planning for the following school year. Board members, having to keep in mind 
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November elections, favored compromise, while EAI, desperate to maintain its contract,  
was ready to forego changes it recommended in an attempt to maintain its contract. Many 
looked at the emerging relationship between the school board and EAI and were left 
asking themselves why EAI was here at all if their recommendations were going to be 
ignored. Board members seemed to be considering the same question; on May 23 they 
voted to give EAI a very limited role in the coming year’s budget. The board’s decision 
reflected the heavy pressure from the Hartford Federation of Teachers, in addition to 
EAI’s submission of bills to the city for questionable services (Green, Hartford Courant, 
May 25, 1995). One Hartford organizer explained the situation:  
The company comes to town, I think they’re based in Minnesota. Bottom 
line is that the city started challenging all these expenses of flying 
executives back and forth from Minnesota, high priced hotels here, cost 
going up, savings not happening, bills going to the city, the city having to 
pay all of this money. Until the relationship finally fell apart all together 
(Interview #3).  
 
The school board vote was overturned by Hartford Mayor Michael Peter and city 
council leaders, who were worried that EAI’s departure would be politically costly and 
jeopardize the year’s tax cut. They advised Superintendent Eddie Davis to make sure EAI 
had a significant role in the schools, despite opposition from the board, because if the 
contract with EAI was broken, the city would be legally obligated to pay more than $4 
million in EAI bills. In addition, the school board did not want it to appear that the 
teachers’ union dictated school policy (Green, Hartford Courant, May 25, 1995).  
 This move on the part of the Mayor established a stormy relationship with the 
school board, with board member Thelma Dickerson arguing that it was a “slap in the 
face” to have a policy-making meeting with the superintendent and EAI and exclude the 
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board. Another board member, Elizabeth Brad Noel, arrived uninvited at the meeting but 
was asked to leave. In addition to Dickerson’s sharp words for Peters, she also criticized 
Davis, saying, “I know what side Eddie is on. Eddie is not on the side of what the board 
wants to see happen” (Green, Hartford Courant, May 25, 1995). While Dickerson may 
have been clear of what side Davis was on, it is unclear what the board was looking for; 
they rejected an initial proposal by Davis for not including EAI but then voted to virtually 
eliminate EAI’s role in its own proposal (Green, Hartford Courant, May 25, 1995). 
Ironically, city hall, which had resisted EAI a year earlier, was all that was keeping it in 
Hartford at this point. 
 Seeking compromise, the school board approved a resolution on June 19, 1995 
telling EAI to focus its attention on five city schools. The plan to shift the focus to only 
five schools was originally suggested by Dickerson as another chance for EAI to prove 
itself. The struggle between the teachers’ union and the board heated up before the board 
meeting vote, when hundreds attended a rally by the teachers’ union and a separate 
meeting conducted by Dickerson, in which she ridiculed retired teachers who drive 
“Jaguars…[and] Mercedes” on their way to vacation homes (Green, Hartford Courant, 
June 20, 1995). Board member Ted Caroll defended the move, arguing that it was not a 
case of the board’s backing off on school reform, but a phasing in of EAI’s work (Green, 
Hartford Courant, June 20, 1995). 
Adding to the emerging confusion about EAI’s role in the Hartford schools as 
elections approached in November, the candidates for election to the school board 
remained divided pro-EAI and anti-EAI. Pre-election, the nine-member board was split 
7-2 in favor of the contract but each of the five seats up for reelection was held by an EAI 
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supporter. The anti-slates consisted of the Children First Slate, organized by an anti-
privatization group of parents and teachers called Citizens for Better Schools, and the 
Hartford Issues Committee, organized by the two anti-EAI school board members. The 
pro-EAI slate, which was backed by the mayor and included school board President 
Thelma Dickerson, was known as the HOPE slate (Hartford’s Organized Parents for 
Education). The Rev. Michael C. Williams, part of the Citizens for Better Schools slate, 
claimed that “the community is against the privatization of public education” and said 
that he was “deeply offended” when the board chose to hire EAI without more 
discussions with the community (Green, Hartford Courant, September 6, 1995).  
In the midst of planning for the upcoming elections, things grew more 
complicated when EAI demanded that they immediately take over full control of the 
school board’s $200 million budget. Although the contract with EAI gave them full 
control of the budget, no move was ever made on the part of EAI to begin taking over 
control until this immediate demand in October. Top city finance officials responded by 
saying that the company had not shown it was capable of handling the budget and that the 
contract required EAI to “establish an overall system of internal controls” to demonstrate 
it could safely manage tax dollars and pay bills before it could assume control of 
spending (Green, Hartford Courant, October 6, 1995). EAI also claimed that it had spent 
more than $5 million to help manage the school district and had not been reimbursed by 
the city, an argument to which city officials replied that EAI had not found any savings in 
the budget as was specified in its contract. Board and city hall officials agreed that EAI 
and the city would have to operate a dual system for a few months to ensure that EAI was 
up to the job of handling a budget of $172.7 million, plus about $27 million in grant 
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money. EAI’s sudden hurry to claim the Hartford School Board’s $200 million budget as 
its own operating revenue could be attributed to its financial problems and that fact that 
such a move would increase the value of the company (Green, Hartford Courant, October 
6, 1995). 
The superintendent’s response to EAI’s demands came in a letter dated October 6, 
1995 that told the company that the city would not comply with its demands and that it 
had until October 18, 1995 to prove it could and would live up to its school management 
contract with the city. Davis went on to say: “I appreciate that EAI is now saying that it is 
finally prepared to assume all of its contractual obligations. However, its failure to do so, 
or even to demonstrate that it is capable of doing so, raises the question of whether EAI 
truly has such capability or intent” (Green, Hartford Courant, October 10, 1995).   
The fact that, a year into its contract, EAI officials never met with city auditors to 
review documentation and systems or taken any real steps in handling the budget, was 
puzzling to people on both sides of the issue. EAI had at first estimated it would take six 
months to hire a payroll company, purchase financial and other software, train staff and 
duplicate the tasks the city performs regularly to ensure that bills are paid and money is 
properly managed. John T. McLaughlin, editor of Education Industry Report and author 
of a recently published booklet, Guidelines for Contracting with Private Providers of 
Education Services, had this to say: “It is more than the $64 million question. It is 
mystifying to me why a company could bust its chops to get a high-profile contract…and 
then be so inattentive to something so fundamental” (Green, Hartford Courant, October 
22, 1995). It seems that EAI moved slowly, not only in taking advantage of the authority 
its contract gave them, but also in implementing its plans. Most of its “first 100 days” 
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plan was revised and little was ever fulfilled. “They were really more focused on trying to 
be accepted and doing things to seem helpful” said board member Stephanie Lightfoot, 
who talked of the amount of time EAI spent getting copy machines into the schools 
(Green, Hartford Courant, October 22, 1995). However helpful, these small moves were 
not what EAI was brought into Hartford to enact and the company, seemingly 
overwhelmed by the 32 school district, simply did not assume the role it had been hired 
to assume. 
Results from the election showed the HOPE candidates winning three seats and 
opponents winning two, giving the pro-EAI forces a 5-4 majority on the board. 
Interestingly, the new board included no Hispanic members, despite a student population 
that is 51% Hispanic. It seemed that many voters pointed to Mayor Peters endorsement as 
the main reason for voting for the HOPE slate, despite increasing problems for EAI, such 
as the Chief Operating Officer resigning a week before the election because of a dispute 
with company Chairman Golle (Green, Hartford Courant, November 8, 1995). The 
election results, however, caused a 13.3% percentage point jump in EAI’s stock prices 
the day after the election, leaving some hope for EAI’s success as an Education 
Management Organization (Walsh, Education Week, November 15, 1995). 
Despite this jump following the election, EAI announced a $2.5 million loss on 
November 15, 1995 for the financial quarter ending September 30. In addition, Baltimore 
announced in November that it was ending its contract with EAI after 3 ½ years of the 
five-year contract. To terminate the contract, Baltimore school board members needed a 
majority vote and 90 days notice. The meeting was held on November 30 and district 
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officials said they planned to serve EAI with official notice by December 1 (Walsh, 
Education Week, November 29, 1995). 
After termination of its contract in Baltimore and the earlier decision by a school 
managed by EAI in Florida not to renew its contract, EAI was left with only one 
contract—the Hartford Schools. When news came shortly after Baltimore’s decision that 
scores in EAI-run Baltimore schools had improved, EAI used the scores to show Hartford 
“that there is definitely a way to improve student performance. But you have to have the 
ability to make things happen” (Green, Hartford Courant, December 13, 1995).  In 
response, Hartford approved on December 29 the payment of $3 million to EAI, 
disputing EAI’s claims to another $3.9 million. District officials pointed out that EAI was 
supposed to be paid only out of the savings it made through more efficient management 
of the school system, of which there had been none. The news of the $3 million payment 
came at a crucial time for EAI after another key official, chief financial officer Franklin 
K. Kuhar, resigned on December 22 (Gamble, Education Week, January 10, 1996). 
On January 23, 1996, just a few weeks after approving the $3 million payment but 
paying only $343,000, the Hartford School Board voted to end its partnership with EAI. 
The school board members said they were “tired of working on the 1 ½-year-old 
relationship—which faltered largely over money issue—instead of concentrating on 
improving the schools” (Green, Hartford Courant, January 24, 1996). Board members, 
seven of whom were in favor of ending the contract with EAI, said that they hoped to 
settle matters with EAI without resorting to lawsuits. EAI reacted with surprise to the 
decision, telling reporters, “We have no sticking points that we can’t negotiate. We are 
not convinced that we cannot do things for these kids. What we see today does no seem 
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logical. We were that close” (Green, Hartford Courant, January 24, 1996). One of the 
main reasons that the contract was terminated was because of the refusal on the part of 
city council members and the city’s lawyers to pay EAI anything except as was dictated 
in the contract. As City Councilman Anthony F. DiPentima pointed out, “The whole 
premise was that EAI was 100 percent, absolutely certain that with a budget of $170 
million they would be able to find savings. They were cocksure of it, absolutely smug 
about it” (Green, Hartford Courant, January 24, 1996). In fact, to pay EAI the school-
management contract would have had to have been amended, which would require city 
council approval, a highly unlikely occurrence (Green, Hartford Courant, January 24, 
1996).  
 While EAI officials may have seen its progress as “so close”, the termination of 
its project in Hartford, its last public-school management contract, proved otherwise.  
EAI’s stock, once at a high of near $50, closed at $4 a share on January 23, after dipping 
as low as $3. Trading was even suspended for a time after reports of Hartford’s pullout 
(Green, Hartford Courant, January 24, 1996). EAI officials, angered at the board 
decision, charged that the district was breaching its contract and threatened to close the 
computer labs the company had installed in five schools if it did not receive its $3.6 
million. As for EAI’s future, Golle announced that it would no longer be in urban 
education systems but in “less political and less volatile suburban districts (Walsh, 
Education Week, January 31, 1996).  
 In an odd twist, however, barely two weeks after the board vote, Hartford city 
officials announced that they might keep the company on to oversee finances of the 
school district. The school district, on the other hand, had locked EAI out of schools 
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where it had installed computers and office equipment, resulting in a tug of war between 
city officials and the school district (Walsh, Education Week, February 14, 1996). Peters’ 
idea of having EAI handle “just the financial part and let the educators educate” was due, 
in large part, to the legal mess surrounding the termination of the 1 ½ year old contract 
and EAI’s claim that Hartford should reimburse them $11.5 million in expenses (Walsh, 
Education Week, February 14, 1996). John B. O’Connell, the chairman of the city 
council’s budget committee said that the continued partnership between EAI and the 
Hartford schools would “settle the financial impact, and it gets the city and the board and 
education system moving forward” (Walsh, Education Week, February 14, 1996). This 
deal did not materialize and in March EAI threatened to sue the city for $100 million for 
breach of contract. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1996, Superintendent Eddie Davis announced 
that he was leaving Hartford to become superintendent of schools in Manchester, 
Connecticut. (Green & Fraham, Hartford Courant, May 20, 1996). In the end, Hartford 
agreed to pay EAI $6.3 million, including the $343,000 it had already paid and the $2.75 
million it had already agreed to pay. The final $3.25 million was to be paid out over five 
years in return for EAI’s promise not to sue the city. O’Connell called the partnership 
with EAI “a rather expensive mistake” and said the final $2.5 million payment was 
“blackmail” (Hartford Courant, July 23, 1996).  
After leaving Hartford, EAI changed its name to Tesseract Group Inc. and moved 
to Scottsdale, Arizona in 1998. It began to focus on running charter schools, which were 
particularly popular in Arizona (Welsh, Education Week, February 9, 2000). By the 
spring of 2000, Tesseract’s stock value had dropped to less than $1 per share and it was 
kicked off the NASDAQ stock market. In addition, it had laid off much of its staff, and 
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fired and subsequently re-hired Golle, its CEO (Miner, Rethinking Schools Online, 
2000).  
 The plight of EAI points to the problems with school privatization attempts and 
the difficulty of bringing about reform. EMOs often tend to underestimate the difficulty 
associated with bringing about reform; back in 1992, Golle told Forbes magazine that 
“we figure we can reduce operating and administrative spending by 25 percent and put 20 
percent back into the classroom…There’s so much fat in the schools that even a blind 
man without his cane could find the way” (Virshup, The Washington Post, April 7, 
1996). Golle, underestimating the simplicity of school reform, never did seem to find the 
way.  
While it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of EAI in Hartford because of 
their slow and limited involvement and the short duration of their stay, it seems that 
“private management of public schools has often led to cleaner buildings, greater access 
to computers, and more individualized instruction. But it has yet to show academic 
improvement anywhere” (Walsh, Education Week, May 29, 1996). In addition, no 
attempt was made by EAI to involve parents, thus further alienating parents and 
community members and creating even further doubt as to the competency of the 
Hartford Board of Education.  
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Shannon Stormont 
Chapter 4—State Control: A Way to Ensure Hartford will “Never be  last again”? 
 
After EAI was finally removed from the picture in Hartford, new questions arose 
as to the future of the Hartford schools. On February 1, 1996 Mayor Mike Peters 
threatened a state takeover if he was not satisfied with the board of education’s plans to 
improve the schools. This idea of a state takeover raised important questions about 
authority and accountability. Board President Stephanie Lightfoot commented: 
We do not need the state to come in. I don’t know what the mayor means. 
There is no [provision] in the Connecticut statutes allowing this. I don’t 
think the mayor has the authority. The board has a plan. It is called a 
strategic plan (Green, Hartford Courant, February 2, 1996).  
 
The increasing tensions between the Hartford School Board and Mayor Peters were 
echoed with other board members’ comments. Newly elected Don Romanick, a lawyer 
who formerly worked for the city, said: “Obviously, it’s Mayor Mike spouting off. The 
state has the ultimate authority to educate the kids. It’s been a crazy week” (Green, 
Hartford Courant, February 2, 1996).  
 What may have written off by many, including these school board members, as 
empty threats turned out to be more serious as time passed. When standardized test 
results were released, indicating that the city’s 25,000 students performed at the worst 
level in Connecticut, these threats were taken much more seriously. In May of 1996, the 
city council voted 6 to 2 to declare a state of emergency for the Hartford schools, which 
was usually reserved for natural disasters or civil unrest. This step was the first in having 
the state takeover administration of the schools (Washington Post, May 15, 1996). In 
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response to this vote, Governor Rowland expressed concern about the state of Hartford’s 
schools but an unwillingness to take over the system. This unwillingness was echoed by 
Education Commissioner Theodore S. Sergi. Sergi argued that he did not believe the state 
should force any changes upon the Hartford schools but should offer assistance if local 
officials requested it (Frahm & Green, Hartford Courant, May 21, 1996). This statement 
raises questions as to what constitutes a request for assistance since public statements by 
the mayor and the city council had already been made requesting a takeover. 
Rowland’s response to the problem seemed to offer no more promise than Sergi’s. 
He questioned “what…the state and the federal government [could] do that they are 
[were] not doing at the local level” (Frahm & Green, Hartford Courant, May 21, 1996). 
His only proposal, however, for helping at the local level involved the promotion of a 
character-building program that he was involved with called “Character Counts”. This 
nationwide program pointed to a lack of ethical training as the source of schools’ 
problems. Based on the tenets of trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring 
and citizenship, the creators believed that the program crossed cultural lines and was said 
to have produced results in several cities throughout the country, decreasing truancy and 
gang-related violence (Frahm & Green, Hartford Courant, May 21, 1996). Rowland’s 
response again points to the question of responsibility; rather than focusing on ways to 
improve the system and administration of the Hartford Board of Education, Rowland 
seemed to hold parents and the students themselves accountable, pointing to a lack of 
character. As Chris Powell, the managing editor of the Journal Inquirer in Manchester 
pointed out, “the real question here is whether state government wants the responsibility 
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or whether it just wants to keep tinkering ineffectually and criticizing people who don’t 
have the power, resources, or capacity to succeed” (Powell, the Networker). 
Rather than opt for a state takeover, the state education department decided in the 
Spring of 1996 to form a new partnership with Hartford schools and promised to come up 
with a reform agenda. Pressure for reform mounted in July of 1996 when a decision was 
reached in Hartford’s Sheff v. O’Neill case, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court 
ordered the legislature to come up with a plan to both improve failing city schools and 
desegregate the region’s schools (Green, Hartford Courant, March 8, 1997), where 95% 
of students were from minority backgrounds (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997).  
The 4-3 decision said that, “the public elementary and high school students in Hartford 
suffer daily from the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as 
poverty, have had on their education” (Bernhard). 
In the fall of 1996, Commissioner Sergi presented the board with his 48-point 
plan to improve schools, which contained many ideas that came from the board itself. 
The Board’s reaction, however, was cool and board members claimed they needed time 
to analyze it and set priorities. Finally, after attending numerous board meetings and 
stressing the importance of each point, Sergi convinced the board to back the entire plan 
(Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997).  
Despite this victory, the situation did not improve for Hartford schools. On 
December 3, 1996 Lightfoot was reelected Board President. Later, board members 
Dickerson and Hall accused Lightfoot and Carroll of brokering a deal to reelect Lightfoot 
in private meetings, resulting in the backing of Romanik for President by Dickerson, 
Hall, Brouillet and Villalobus. The remaining four board members, however, together 
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with Romanik himself, remained in support of Lightfoot. On December 11, Lightfoot 
resigned as President because she did not want to lead a divided board. She remained a 
member of the board and Romanik was elected in her place. This entire charade was 
played out before the public, resulting in a public outcry for the board’s resignation. On 
December 16, 1997, the City Council considered a resolution asking the board to resign, 
which did not pass. The last straw came on December 17 when, at a packed meeting at 
Weaver High School, board member Fournier launched into a series of personal attacks, 
resulting in a parent jumping onto the stage and knocking a pitcher of water onto 
Fournier (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997).  This chaotic scene illustrated the 
divisiveness that existed within the board. As one board member said of the 
disagreements among board members and with Superintendents: 
 And a lot of the tension between the board and Superintendent got played 
out in the public arena which then created more tension and more anxiety 
in the district. Frankly, it didn’t make either the Board or the 
Superintendent or the district as a whole look like it was functioning very 
well, which of course contributed to the decision on the state’s part to 
takeover the system. The good news was that there were a lot of debates 
and they were in the public. The bad news was that they often got out of 
hand and they often kept us from conducting from conducting business 
and certainly kept us from moving forward as fast as we would have liked 
(Interview #2). 
 
Later that same month the Board again demonstrated its indecidiveness when it 
came to the “particularly contentious and divisive process” of hiring a new 
superintendent, Patricia Daniel (Green, Hartford Courant, March 8, 1997). Black 
community leaders expressed their disappointment with the three finalists for the job, 
urging the board to begin a new search process. The board remained intent on hiring 
Hoboken school Superintendent Edwin Duroy but eventually backed down amidst 
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pressure from the community. The swing vote in that decision was Lightfoot, who 
claimed she chose Daniel to try to stop the fighting within the board and between the 
board and others (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997). One community organizer 
described the pressure applied by the community and the board’s inability to make a 
decision: 
The real community packed the room that night at a Board meeting. A 
press release from the Board was handed out in advance of the meeting 
giving the reactions of Board members to select Candidate A as 
Superintendent of schools and so that was distributed. However, because 
of the pressure of the people that night for the elected body, the elected 
Board of Ed picked Candidate B as the Superintendent instead. It upset the 
political orchestrators of the original plan. This Candidate B turned out to 
be a black woman brought in as Superintendent. Well the bottom line is 
she came in as Superintendent and had no support at all from the City 
government and the political leadership of the city and interference from 
Day One in her attempt to gain control of the school system ensued. The 
political machine then kicked in to the next level and said okay, they made 
a mistake. They picked the wrong person as Superintendent who we did 
not support for political leadership, challenging the question of a 
bipartisan elected Board of Education. So that political leadership then 
passed an ordinance or resolution begging the state legislature to abolish 
the Hartford Board of Ed and as part of that process they forced out the 
appointed Superintendent of schools.  (Interview #3). 
 
Hartford’s problems mounted when Hartford High School was threatened with a 
loss of its accreditation in April of 1997, which would have made it only the second 
unaccredited high school in New England (Weizel, New York Times, June 1, 1997). In 
addition, the City Council passed a resolution to hire an auditor to investigate the school 
board’s finances. Hartford Councilman John O’Connell expressed his distrust of the 
board, vowing to, “expose [their] petulance and [their] corruption. I will expose the 
board’s malfeasance” (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997).  
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On March 10, 1997, leaders of the city council and  board of education, along with 
key legislators, announced support for the creation of an independent panel that would 
manage all but curriculum and instruction in Hartford schools. The panel would maintain 
“near-total control of the city schools, including the authority to open union contracts for 
renegotiation, to hire and fire employees and to oversee administrative matters, such as 
finances and management of buildings and ground” (Green, Hartford Courant, March 8, 
1997). With the failure of EAI still fresh in the memories of school officials, it seems 
surprising that they would be willing to hand over such a large amount of control so 
willingly.  
This panel, unlike EAI, would be appointed by the legislature and the governor, 
pointing to new statewide accountability for the success or failure of Hartford schools. 
Despite this ruling that the segregation was unconstitutional, the opinion gave no 
deadline for action and no guidance to state officials regarding a remedy (Bernhard, 
www.bernhard.norwalk.ct.us/issues/kbschlaws.html).  
The proposed takeover was seen by many, including board present Donald V. 
Romanik, as “an acknowledgement that the problems of the system are so significant that 
the current structures just don’t seem to work” (New York Times, March 11, 1997). One 
board member expressed his feelings about the takeover: 
Members of the Board, including myself, signaled to the State legislature 
that we thought it would be a good idea and we said that it would be even 
a better idea if two conditions were included and both of the conditions 
were included in the final legislation. And those conditions, first of all, I 
said that the employment contracts that we have with our employees 
needed to be revised in ways that gave more management authority to the 
superintendent and to the board. Our contention was that it would be hard 
to bring about changes unless there were some modifications to the 
collective bargaining agreement. And the principal change that came about 
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in the legislation was that an arbitrator was deciding between a union 
position and a management position would take into account first and 
foremost what was the interest of the students. Previous to that they would 
take into account first and foremost what was the precedent, what was the 
history. And because we had such a lousy history, we had been making 
very bad decisions or the arbitrator was making very bad decisions, we 
had successfully argued that they should have as their most compelling 
criterion what is in the best interest of the students. So that’s now in the 
state law (Interview #2). 
 
 
The recommendation was met with both criticism that it was going too far and not 
far enough. It was opposed by the Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, who argued 
that the state had already teamed with Hartford to produce the 48 recommendations on 
improving the schools. President George Springer raised the question: “Why do we in the 
middle of this process want to jump in and create another panel?” (New York Times, 
March 11, 1997). Parents, on the other hand, echoed Shirley West’s sentiment that, “if 
you’re going to have this advisory panel, it should be able to help make some drastic 
changes. Everyone knows what the problem is—it’s the management” (New York Times, 
March 11, 1997).  
In an attempt to review the recommended plan, Governor John Rowland took a 
trip to the Hartford Public Schools with Sergi and decided to allow the legislature’s 
Education Committee to work on a bill that would set parameters for a state takeover of a 
school system. This decision reflected the decision by the Commission on Secondary 
Public Schools of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges to revoke the 
accreditation of Hartford Public High School because of funding problems, crumbling 
facilities, and graduation rate of 40 percent. Dean Pagani, spokesman for the governor, 
discussed accountability in public, arguing that “the current board of education and 
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previous boards of education haven’t done a good job running the system”, setting aside 
any statewide accountability for the failure of the capital city’s schools (The News Times, 
April 11, 1997).  
The proposed law regarding school takeover continued to gain steam in the 
General Assembly because of Hartford Public’s loss of accreditation. The law would 
make the Superintendent of Hartford schools responsible for answering to the appointed 
board of trustees, raising questions about the voters of Hartford’s democratic rights to 
have the person they elected Superintendent run the schools. State Rep. Kenneth P. Green 
of Hartford viewed the bill skeptically, arguing that it was too early for a takeover. He 
argued that the bill “takes away local control” and that “we have a new Superintendent 
and I’d like to see what she can do. We also have the 48 recommendations [for improving 
the schools] from the state and I’d like to see what movement we are making” (Green, 
Hartford Courant, April 9, 1997). Superintendent Patricia Daniel also spoke out against 
the state takeover, arguing that she had only been given a month to produce any changes. 
She pointed out that “the people of this community elected a nine-member board to 
provide leadership for the children of this community” and that little research had been 
done about the effectiveness of state takeovers, particularly with regards to student 
performance (Green, Hartford Courant, April 10, 1997).  
One key change that evolved in the legislation was the provision that all labor 
contracts would remain in place until they expired, when they would then be renegotiated 
by the new board of trustees. Despite this change, the legislation was intensely lobbied 
against by the Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, who wanted the board to try 
other reforms (Green, Hartford Courant, April 10, 1997). Hartford Federation of Teachers 
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President Cheryl Daniels said, “If there has to be a [takeover], we can accept that, but we 
don’t feel taking away our rights that aren’t any different than any others should happen” 
(Green, Hartford Courant, April 10, 1997). Daniels said that the existing teachers’ 
contract prevented excessively large class sizes and had its own mechanisms for contract 
negotiations, making the change to three neutral arbitrators unnecessary.  
As the union’s lobbying against the bill picked up, board member Stephanie 
Lightfoot stepped down from the board and joined those calling for a state takeover of 
city schools. In her resignation letter, Lightfoot acknowledged that “to simply remove the 
current board and replace it with another that has to work within the same restrictions as 
the current board will do nothing to help Hartford. Create a panel that really has some 
authority or leave it alone…The days of half-stepping have passed” (Green, Hartford 
Courant, April 10, 1997).  Lightfoot’s departure added more pressure on the state to 
takeover schools, especially following board member Stephen Fournier’s resignation in 
January of 1997 and board President Romanik’s statement acknowledging that he saw his 
role as that of caretaker until the state stepped in.  
Two days after Lightfoot acted, the Legislature’s Education Committee voted 28 
to 1 to dissolve the Hartford Board of Education and replace it with a seven-member 
board of trustees (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997). The bill passed 27-9 in the 
Senate and 135-7 in the House (Archer, Education Week, April 23, 1997). This 
legislation had always had the support of education committee co-chairmen Sen. Thomas 
Gaffrey (D-Meriden) and Rep. Cameron Staples (D-New Haven). Originally, however, 
the bill lacked the support of House Speaker Tom Ritter and Senate President Kevin 
Sullivan, who instead supported a weaker bill placing Hartford on probation and created a 
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mechanism for the board of trustees to takeover management of failing school districts 
when necessary. Their support was eventually won over for the stronger bill when the 
City Council refused to accept $1.7 million in state funds for education because it feared 
the city would have to raise taxes next year because of a complicated state grants 
formula. Others believed that they simply refused the funds because of disagreements 
between the city council and the board of education. Opponents of the bill became further 
convinced when it became known that Hartford Public was losing its accreditation 
(Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997). The final bill also received the backing of the 
Hartford Federation of Teachers, who split with its affiliate, the Connecticut State 
Federation of Teachers (Green, Hartford Courant, April 17, 1997). In the end, this 
legislation passed with the support of House Speaker Tom Ritter and Senate President 
Kevin Sullivan (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997), in addition to Superintendent 
Daniel, who reversed her opposition to the bill during the last week before it passed 
(Green, Hartford Courant, April 17, 1997). Governor John Rowland also agreed to sign 
the bill when it got to his desk (Kuczkowski, Hartford Advocate, 1997). 
The takeover was the first in Connecticut but state takeovers had occurred in other 
cities, namely Newark, N.J. and Cleveland, Ohio (Archer, Education Week, April 23, 
1997). The takeover in Hartford raised some very important questions of accountability, 
since the board of trustees would seem to only be accountable to the politicians that 
appointed them. Others, including trustee Diane Alverio, believed their lack of 
accountability to be an asset. She pointed out that, “We weren’t elected, so we don’t owe 
anybody anything, other than the children of Hartford, who we are obligated to provide 
the best possible education. Every special interest group has a political mandate, and I 
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have already been approached by those who think the old political rules still apply” 
(Weizel, The New York Times, June 1, 1997). While a second seven-member advisory 
panel comprised of parents and teachers was created to heed parent comments, residents 
also lost access to a locally elected board of education. The panel was also not required to 
include any Hartford residents, adding to the concerns of Senator William Aniskovich 
that “we are going to take [nine] democratically elected people and give the power that 
they exercise to seven appointed people. This bill is a very serious change in the principal 
of self-government” (Green, Hartford Courant, April 17, 1997). These concerns were 
echoed by Senator Anthony Guglielmo, who argued that “what [the takeover] says is you 
can’t solve your own problems…that some outside group of elite people are going to 
come in and solve your problems” (Green, Hartford Courant, April 17, 1997).  
Parental responses were mixed as well. Rev. Michael C. Williams, a parent of 
three children in the Hartford school system, expressed his doubts about the takeover, 
saying “I don’t think anything is really going to change, I don’t see this board as having 
the skills or sensitivity needed to truly understand the problems these urban children are 
facing. We’re either moving out of the city or putting them in private school, I don’t want 
them subjected to any more educational experiments” (Weizel, New York Times, June 1, 
1997). Another parent, David MacDonald, president of the Hartford Parents Network, a 
citywide organization of parents’ groups, said of the trustees: 
They are a good group of people, and they certainly don’t seem to carry 
with them the kind of political baggage as the previous board, so that 
makes us very hopeful. But if they don’t act boldly and quickly, they’re 
going to lose some of the positive feeling the community now feels 
towards them (Weizel, New York Times, June 1, 1997).  
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 The seven trustees included: Robert M. Furek, 54, the board chairman and a 
retired chief executive of Heublein Inc., a Hartford-based spirits company; Diane Alverio 
of New Britain, vice president and general manager of WLAT-AM in Hartford and a 
former television reporter; Lorraine Aronson of Manchester, assistant to the cha ncellor at 
the University of Connecticut at Storrs and a former State Deputy Education 
Commissioner; Ana-Maria Garcia of Hartford, chief executive officer of the Greater 
Hartford Y.W.C.A.;  Maria Spivey, vice president of community relations at Hartford 
Hospital; Henry Frascadore, a former principal of South Catholic School in Hartford and 
former assistant to the superintendent of school for the Hartford Archdiocese; and 
Richard Weaver-Bey, a Hartford real estate investor, apartment manager, and radio show 
owner (Weizel, New York Times, June 1, 1997). Of these seven trustees, the only one 
with children in Hartford schools was Ana-Maria Garcia, who had a daughter at Hartford 
High School, as compared to 2/3 of the elected board who had children in the school 
system (Interview #2).  
 Although it is unclear at which point they were instituted and to what extent, 
several respondents in the study acknowledge the board’s introduction of school 
governance teams into Hartford. These teams, comprised of parents, teachers, students 
and administrators, were discussed by one school board member: 
I’d say probably from 1994 until about 1997 when we left we were 
operating the school governance teams, probably about a three year 
period. We thought that decentralizing decision making, i.e., moving more 
and more decision of the Central Office and into the school sites made a 
lot of sense. So we were trying more responsibility, more resources, and 
more authority to the principals and what we called the school governance 
teams. And those teams would be comprised of teachers, parents, 
community members, as well the Principal. We were successful to the 
extent that we set up school governance teams and we gave each of them 
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what we called executive coaches, people who could assist them with 
running their meetings and establishing their plans. But they were not 
around long enough nor did they work well enough for any of the changes 
that we had hoped would come about in terms of student performance, 
remember the whole goal here was to improve student performance. I 
think that we probably would have had to have a Superintendent who 
understood better how to build and operate a decentralized decision 
making system and we would have needed more time to try that on before 
we could have seen results. But the fact is, I’d say the public was pretty 
restless for greater results quicker. We probably saw some improvements, 
particularly over a 3 or 4 year period, we were seeing on average 3-4 
percentage point gains on most measures but the public was looking for 
more dramatic improvements than that (Interview #2). 
 
Another interview with a Community Organizer revealed a different view of the 
school governance teams: 
All the time, by the way, this was in the strategic plan, this idea of school-
based management, which had been tried in Chicago. So every school was 
to have this school-based management team that included parents and they 
were going to decentralize some of the decisions and they started to do a 
little bit of that but it had nothing to do with making any decisions in the 
schools. They had no authority to do anything and nobody was going to 
give them any (Interview #1).  
 
After the state takeover, the Hartford schools remained involved in scandal. The 
new board of trustees began to feel that Superintendent Daniel was not in support of their 
ideas for reform, including more charter schools, better fiscal management and increased 
and faster decentralization of the central office (Weizel, New York Times, June 28, 
1998), resulting in a resignation by Daniel after only 14 months in office. Daniel, under 
pressure and with a $290,000 buyout, resigned as superintendent of schools on May 19, 
1998. The trustees then created the position of chief administrative officer to run the 
fiscal and other noneducational aspects of the system, allowing the superintendent to 
concentrate solely on classroom improvements, and named Ana-Maria Garcia, a member 
of the trustees, to the position. In addition, Superintendent Daniel was replaced by 
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Benjamin Dixon, the state's deputy secretary of education, who was appointed interim 
superintendent. The city failed, however, to thoroughly check out these appointments and 
only nineteen days after Dixon was appointed he announced his plans to take a job in 
Virginia in August. This embarrassment only heightened when it was revealed that 
Garcia had very little background in the finance and accounting that her position 
required, in addition to having very questionable financial records (Condon, Hartford 
Courant, June 11, 1998). After her appointment, news surfaced that Garcia had failed to 
pay over $15,000 in local, federal and motor vehicle taxes, had defaulted on more than 
$36,000 in college loans, and had charged thousands of dollars in personal expenses to an 
agency credit card while serving as chief executive at the Hartford region YWCA (Green, 
Hartford Courant, June 16, 1998).  In addition, Garcia’s ethics were questioned when 
reports were raised that she had penciled in someone else’s address on a form so that her 
child could go to school in another town (Horgan, Hartford Courant, June 26, 1998). The 
State Ethics Commission was also investigating whether Garcia violated state law by 
accepting her new job after the board of trustees, of which she was a member, had 
removed Patricia Daniel as superintendent (Green, Hartford Courant, June 16, 1998).  
 The board of trustees appointed Interim Superintendent Matthew Borrelli during 
the summer of 1998, who served until April 1, 1999 when Anthony Amato, former 
superintendent of District 6 in New York, took over as superintendent. A quarterly report 
prepared by the state Department of Education assessing Borrelli’s time in office showed 
administrative and budget progress—for the first time in years, the system was running 
on a surplus and hadn’t had to impose a spending freeze during the year—but reminded 
that work still needed to be done on student achievement (Rodriguez, Hartford Courant, 
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May 6, 1999). The city’s overall scores on the Connecticut Mastery Test were still ranked 
last in the state, with 17 of 32 schools scoring within the state’s lowest level of 
performance. While test scores had been demonstrating steady gains over the prior three 
years, the 1998 test results showed a drop in reading scores and no change in math scores. 
In addition, the schools did not have a uniform approach to student literacy and some 
elementary teachers did not have the necessary curriculum guides for their classes 
(Rodriguez, Hartford Courant, May 6, 1999).  
Amato made clear upon his hiring that his immediate focus was on districtwide 
improvement on the mastery test in the fall of 1999 (Rodriguez, Hartford Courant, May 
6, 1999). On his first day as superintendent he vowed that Hartford would never be last 
again on the CMTs (Gottlieb, Hartford Courant, March 2, 2002). In an attempt to meet 
that goal, he added an hour of reading to class schedules and more than 2,500 students 
attended CMT-focused classes over spring vacation. Teachers and community agencies 
were also preparing for an expanded summer school program that focused more on 
academics and less on recreation (Rodriguez, Hartford Courant, May 6, 1999). While 
these changes signaled hope for better scores, the test-based teaching approach raised 
important questions about the bias of standardized tests and their ability to accurately 
measure student achievement.  
 Amato was well-received in Hartford because of his public speaking ability and 
inspiring personal story. He was the son of a single mother who worked as a flamenco 
dancer and was  moved from school to school between Puerto Rico and the South Bronx. 
Amato set to work right away on improving literacy in Hartford, installing a highly 
structured reading program called Success For All (SFA), which opponents suggested 
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stood for "Somebody Fire Amato." Many of these opponents were teachers who 
complained that the program didn't allow for creativity because of its scripted nature and 
focused too heavily on improving CMT scores and less on learning (Gottlieb. Hartford 
Courant, March 2, 2002). One community organizer pointed out that, “It’s scripted. It’s 
totally scripted. Too bad if they have any questions, we’re not taking them. The question 
is: Are we educating them?” (Interview #1). In addition, the program required all teachers 
to teach reading for 90 minutes a day, including art and music teachers. Parents and 
teachers also complained about the loss of time for science, social studies and recess. 
These complaints, according to one Hartford community organizer, were limited: 
[Amato issued] gag orders that no City of Hartford employee can speak 
against the policy of the Board of Ed. You can’t speak to the press, you 
cannot speak in a public meeting. I mean this is a Memorandum that went 
out to every teacher and employee that said that you cannot speak 
negatively about any public policy or it is equal to insubordination  
(Interview #1). 
The autocratic policies enacted by Amato have resulted in a lack of available 
information on teacher and staff response to his reforms. Success for All, while 
maintaining criticism for being rigid and stifling creativity, has also received praise for 
presenting a standardized curriculum that allowed students in Hartford, who are often 
subject to frequent moves, to change schools and avoid a loss of momentum. In addition, 
the program has been credited with boosting test scores each year. In the 2001-2002 
school year, the regular education students gained 5.5 points overall in the Connecticut 
Mastery Test, leading many to hail Amato a hero (Gottlieb, Hartford Courant, March 2, 
2002).  
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In addition to his commitment to improve test scores, Amato also implemented 
new strategies to involve parents. He got rid of the school governance teams and the 
notion of decentralized governance of schools and instead focused on using parent 
liaisons in each school to reach out to parents. These liaisons, who were mostly parents 
themselves, were paid to serve as the connection between parents and schools. Many of 
these liaisons had been employed by the schools under other administrations to serve a 
similar function but “[the] principals totally took them over and had them doing truancy 
kind-of stuff that had nothing to do with parental involvement” (Interview #1). When 
Amato came into office his autocratic approach carried over into his efforts to improve 
parental involvement. As one community organizer noted: 
[Amato] put together a person in his office who [would] supervise all of 
these parent liaisons so…they’re doing what Amato wants them to do, not 
even what the principals want them to do. But again Amato’s version of 
parent involvement is: “I want parents who will listen to what my agenda 
is and agree with it”…Parent involvement to him is to develop a group of 
parents who believe in what he’s doing. So he in fact had his staff pull 
together select parents and they meet in the summer and he basically feeds 
them his agenda so that they become advocates for him. His idea of parent 
involvement is to train a group of parents who believe in what he’s doing 
so that they then will advocate for his agenda. And in the schools 
everybody is just scratching their heads trying to figure it out. Everybody 
wants parent involvement but nobody is putting in the effort to do it… 
[Real] parent involvement in all of this has just totally been ignored. There 
are very few schools in the city where the PTO can generate more than 2 
parents or 3 parents at a meeting (Interview #1). 
 
While Amato’s approach to parental involvement is questionable, many believe 
that he has brought some improvements to Hartford’s schools. In addition to improved 
test scores, he has helped provide necessary materials in schools and has sorted through 
administrative problems (Interview #1). It is because of these triumphs that on September 
21, 1999, the state-appointed board of trustees voted to request a two-year extension of its 
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management of Hartford’s public schools though June 30, 2002. At the special meeting 
during which the vote took place, only a dozen administrators and residents were present, 
a stark contrast to the controversial and widely attended meetings under the school board 
a few years earlier. Superintendent Amato supported the extension, saying that, “One of 
the strongest elements that maintains stability in any district is a continuous board” 
(Rodriguez, Hartford Courant, September 22, 1999). The proposal to extend state control 
was passed and in June of 2001 the state legislature agreed to return a great deal of school 
governance power over to the city after another brief extension of state control. This 
decision extended the term of the state trustees by six months until December of 2002 
and created a hybrid school board of four elected members and three members appointed 
by the mayor in consultation with the governor and approved by the city council 
(Gottlieb, Hartford Courant, June 7, 2001).  
After a growing period of progress, people seemed relatively confident about this 
transition until a new twist added to the saga; Superintendent Amato announced his 
resignation on March 1, 2002. After three years as superintendent, Amato said that 
"Hartford is in a great position to keep moving forward" and that he was looking for a 
new challenge (Gottlieb, Hartford Courant, March 2, 2002). Critics argued that Amato 
was abandoning a challenge he had only begun to tackle in his three years and during a 
very critical transition period. In addition, Amato’s announcement of his resignation 
came in March and said he might be leaving before the end of the school year in June 
(Gottlieb, Hartford Courant, March 2, 2002). This resignation, by a popular and yet 
imperfect leader, could signal yet another long string of superintendents and chaos for 
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Hartford school children or hope for a more decentralized system of governance that truly 
involves parents. Unfortunately, only time will tell.  
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Shannon Stormont 
Chapter 5—Policy Implications—The Future of Hartford’s Schools 
 
 When examining Hartford schools over the past decade, it is difficult to truly 
assess parental involvement and student success under different administrations because 
of the absurdly high turnover rate of superintendents. When looking, instead, at parental 
involvement and student success under different governance structures, one can 
categorize these structures as: City Control (Pre-1994), Private Control (1994-1996), and 
State Control (1996-Present). It seems that under none of these governance structures was 
parental involvement particularly emphasized, with the most prominent effort coming 
from Josiha Haig pre-EAI, whose contract was not renewed by the school board. Student 
success, on the other hand, seems to be strongest under Amato and state control, at least 
as far as standardized testing goes. Does this mean that student success and parental 
involvement are not linked? I would argue that it does not, but that, given the information 
I have found, parental involvement has not truly been emphasized to an extent in 
Hartford that would constitute assessment.  
Test scores seem to indicate that student success has been greatest under the 
administration that is farthest from the local level and parents—Amato and the state-
appointed board of trustees. I would argue that this seemingly misleading data must not 
be exaggerated to say that Amato’s administration has done an excellent job. Instead, one 
must look at the administrations with which we are comparing it to, none of which 
emphasized community or parental involvement and none of which had the support of 
both the school board and community.  
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The most long- lived, and noticeably effective, reforms have come under Amato,  
leaving many questioning what will happen when he departs Hartford and the city takes 
back control in December of 2002. Judging from the past, this transition seems to invite 
chaos; the current board will have to appoint a new superintendent who will then serve 
under the newly appointed board, a transition that was unsuccessful in the case of 
Superintendent Daniel. 
 The hailed success of Amato’s reforms also raise important questions as to the 
definition of success. While test scores showed improvements, it seems that Amato 
favored a rigid style of teaching that catered to the CMT’s. While Hartford is no longer 
last in CMT scores, a sign of improvement for many, I would question whether this jump 
in scores really shows that students are learning more. Are more students learning how to 
read or are they learning how to take standardized tests? One parent and former school 
member expressed his concern, noting: 
I guess my worry is, quite candidly, is that the disproportionate emphasis 
on test scores is causing kind-of a drill and kill mentality that is long term, 
I don’t think encourages the kind of creative teaching and learning that we 
want to encourage. I think we’ve lost a lot of our best teachers and I know 
we’ve lost a lost of our best students. You can make the argument and I’ve 
heard the argument for standardized teaching and testing but the flip side 
for that is that that’s really not for everybody. I think ultimately the district 
would have to shift back to a more central position that is balanced and 
that recognizes the individual teaching styles of kids and teachers frankly 
and allows for that even as there is some consistency in the curriculum and 
scheduling and so forth (Interview #2).  
 
In addition to standardized teaching, it seems that Amato’s style has alienated 
many teachers and parents alike, bringing us even farther away from turning schools into 
true communities of learning. Instead, we have a superintendent using threats of 
insubordination to silence criticism, leading to less chaos and a false sense of unanimity 
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and confidence in the system. While this change arguably led to a renewed sense of 
confidence in schools, we must remember to question at what cost, and the answer here 
seems to point towards the children.  
With all of the criticisms Hartford schools have faced over the last ten years, one 
would expect a slew of proposed reforms. Instead, however, one has seen that all reforms 
have been short- lived, with citizens and city officials impatient for quick and dramatic 
results. This impatience seems to explain, in large part, the many short- lived 
superintendents. As one former school board member pointed out:  
I think part of it was an era of increased expectations with diminishing 
resources to meet those expectations created lots of tension. And the 
Superintendent is the guy in charge so if not enough change is happening 
quickly enough or exactly in the direction that you’d prefer, it doesn’t take 
too long for one person, then two persons, and then three and ultimately, 
five persons to say, “All right enough. You’ve lost my support.” And once 
you lose the support of 5 people, you’re gone (Interview #2).  
 
 When examining the politics of school reform, it is obvious that racial politics 
play a large part, as demonstrated by the community’s support for Superintendents Haig 
and Daniel, both African American, and the lack of support from the school board. The 
school board, while composed mostly of parents before the state took control, was 
replaced with business men and women who, with the exception of one trustee, did not 
have children in the school system. As one community organizer pointed out:  
We organized to stop EAI; they forced it down our throat anyway. We 
pushed and we got a new black Superintendent in there and they ran her 
off and turned it over to this committee of primarily white business 
leaders. And so there’s nothing out there right now in organizing to 
prepare for the return of public control over public education. So what 
we’re planning here is to launch series of community education activities. 
To have people understand the new structure that’s coming into play, 
powers and relationships and authorities. To try to bring in the focus on 
activities and processes that might help glean the kind of information that 
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people need to understand better how education should work (Interview 
#3).  
 
What does the lack of effort to include parents and community members in the 
selection of the board of trustees say about state control? It seems that, in an attempt to 
bring about reform, efforts to remain true to the will of the electorate, who had already 
elected school board members and rallied behind Superintendent Daniel, were lost. In 
addition to the presence of racial politics, a growing urban conservatism has factored into 
school politics, as demonstrated by the EAI controversy (Simmons, Journal of Urban 
Affairs, 1998). The hiring of EAI was heavily supported by the local business lobby, 
which was also a source of support for Mayor Peters. In fact, one former board of 
education member who spearheaded the move to hire EAI is employed by the chamber of 
commerce in a leadership development program. The chamber also works closely with 
the local media, including the Hartford Courant, which adamantly supported the hiring of 
EAI and gave candidates with similar positions significant backing during the 1995 
school board primary and general election. Mayor Peters also backed the hiring of EAI 
publicly in an attempt to maintain a majority of school board members who supported 
privatization in theory. Even as it became clear that EAI was doing a poor job in Hartford 
schools, many of these elected officials defended their place in Hartford, making the 
issue more about privatization as a strategy and less about properly educating Hartford’s 
children (Simmons, Journal of Urban Affairs, 1998).  
 When looking at reform efforts over the past ten years, there are two different 
models of governance at work—a strong school board/weak superintendent model and a 
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strong superintendent/weak school board model. As one school board member pointed 
out: 
 Basically I’d say that in the past you had, for better or for worse, a strong 
board/ relatively weak superintendent model. Now you’ve got a strong 
superintendent/relatively weak board model. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to both. My own view is tha t ultimately you want a balance 
of power—I’d say probably the board took too much responsibility in the 
past, part of that was the function was a leadership vacuum in the 
Superintendent’s Office, part of that was just people’s individual styles of 
governance. I’d say that today the board of trustees has probably seeded 
too much authority to the superintendent and hasn’t offered him enough of 
a check and balance either. I think the best path lies somewhere between 
those two extremes (Interview #2). 
 
 If so many would agree that the best path runs between these extremes, what 
makes it so difficult to strike this balance? It seems that the chaos and division among 
elected board members did not help them form a unified path for reform but instead 
prompted a power struggle among factions. In effect, it seems that the politics took 
precedent over the well-being of the children, which was lost in the struggle. The 
decision to hire EAI, and then be non-committal, eventually having to pay them $6.3 
million to leave, was characteristic of the board’s inability to take a decisive stance. It 
seems that they were afraid of true reform, as evidenced by their inability to choose a 
superintendent after EAI or even a board president. These squabbles, when put up to the 
public eye, became magnified to raise even more serious doubts about the future of the 
schools, leading to the eventual declaration of a state of emergency that prompted the 
state takeover.  
 As Hartford once again faces a period of transition and the return of power to the 
city, it is time to look towards proposed reforms, including attempts to involve parents in 
schools. Some proposed ideas for reform that include parental involvement are detailed in 
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the U.S. Department of Education’s Putting the Pieces Together: Comprehensive School-
linked Strategies for Children and Families. This guide points out that: 
Traditional programs tend to approach their clients in terms of problems 
that need treatment, without helping them develop long-term skills or 
preventive behaviors. Their complex service delivery systems and 
eligibility requirements are confusing and intimidating for many families, 
especially those who have low levels or literacy, are not native English 
speakers, or are newcomers to this country. And many traditional 
programs are simply unavailable to those who lack transportation or child 
care or who work schedules conflict with program hours (US Dept of 
Education, 1996).  
 
 Instead, comprehensive strategies for reform are designed to help children, 
parents and families solve immediate problems and develop the capacity to avoid future 
crises. In addition, these programs would build collaboration among all of the 
community’s major groups, including parents, churches, and agencies and organizations, 
involving multiple stakeholders in all stages of program planning, design, and 
implementation. A comprehensive attempt at reform would communicate in languages 
accessible to all partners and stem from a shared vision about improving long-term 
conditions for children, families, and communities, rather than focusing solely on 
providing services or treating a problem (US Dept of Education, 1996).  
 It seems that these comprehensive reforms can only come about when either 
school leaders or the community become aware of an urgent need for change. While 
Hartford seems aware that change and improvement are necessary, school leaders and 
policy makers do not seem to be willing to invest the time and money into establishing 
long-term community partnerships, instead focusing solely on improving test scores. 
While it has been shown that both children and school staff benefit from comprehensive 
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strategies, little has been done in Hartford to demonstrate the commitment to parental 
involvement that the strategic plans would imply exist. It has been shown that: 
Children and families benefit from comprehensive strategies on many 
levels: they get help facing immediate challenges, learn lifelong methods 
for improving their own circumstances, gain access to an integrated and 
streamlined system of continuous human development, and become better 
able to participate in their own learning. Teachers, principals, counselors, 
nurses, and other school staff also benefit from comprehensive, school-
linked strategies. Every day, these practitioners and administrators see that 
hunger, lack of medical care, inadequate child care, poverty, teen 
pregnancy, violence and other social conditions create barriers to students’ 
learning. Through comprehensive strategies, school staff gain allies they 
can turn to—both inside and outside the school—to help address these 
challenges (US Dept of Education, 1996, p.4).  
 
 Given these advantages, it is surprising that more has not been done to make 
schools about more than the isolated aim of education but instead part of a larger effort to 
improve children’s lives in many regards. When examining the possibility of such a 
partnership in Hartford, it seems that parents would need to organize to initiate 
collaboration and force administrators to make good on their promise to involve parents. 
One Chane, one grassroots organization in Hartford, is now attempting to organize 
parents to prepare them to be heard as the upcoming transition back to local control 
approaches. This organizing prompted by parents and community groups seems to work 
best in the long run, because, as one community organizer pointed out: 
 My contention is if you have the school system organizing parents, you 
can always question the legitimacy of, “Whose agenda is this?” So the 
effort of the schools to organize parents is usually, “We’re going to make 
you better parents. We’re going to straighten you out. We’re going to give 
you parenting skills. We’re going to talk about raising your children.” And 
so you have this clash of values. And so for parents to even come to those 
kind of meetings, they’re implicitly, at least, agreeing that something is 
wrong with them, that they’re deficient in some way. It’s just not the same 
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dynamic as you have in more suburban, more affluent schools (Interview 
#1).   
 
While funding has oftentimes gone to waste in the past because of a lack of 
organizing skill on the part of parent groups, one can only hope that this will change with 
One Chane’s new attempt at organizing parents. The community organizer I spoke with 
also pointed out that “it is extremely difficult to organize low income parents around 
education issues without it being totally independent and extremely well funded. With 
professional organizers” (Interview #1). For the sake of families in Hartford, hopefully 
One Chane can achieve what so many other organizations trying to organize Hartford 
parents have failed to do—bring about true reform.  
 In addition to requiring parents to mobilize, comprehensive school-based reform 
would require a receptive school board that was willing to push real reform. As the 
current board of trustees shifts back to a school board, four members will be elected by 
the local community, while three will be appointed by the mayor in consultation with the 
governor and approved by the city council. These plans for a hybrid board raise some 
concerns about unity among board members and similar agendas. Hopefully, board 
members will be able to join together to build off of Amato’s successes, possibly using 
his standardized curriculums, which do help ease some of the problems associated with 
the highly transient nature of Hartford students, while beginning to bring parents into the 
picture.  
 In order to be effective, reforms aimed at improving parental involvement need to 
be geared towards involving parents and using them as a resource, not improving parents. 
In a recently published report by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, 
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part of the U.S. Department of Education, parental involvement is once again deemed 
necessary in location where “families and communities are weak” (Coleman, 1991). This 
statement serves as a prime example of what many school systems, including Hartford 
have been unable to do—move away from judging parents and communities and focus 
instead on involving them and truly hearing what they have to say. This publication goes 
on to suggest that “the effectiveness of schools in settings where the social capital of 
family and community is weak depends upon the rebuilding of that social capital” 
(Coleman, 1991). This belief that it is the school system’s job to “save” or “fix” parents 
only further alienates parents and community members. True comprehensive reform will 
come only when school systems learn to acknowledge the culture of a particular 
community as an asset and not an obstacle and learn to involve parents in a form of 
shared decision-making. Administrators must realize that while they may favor 
experimenting with our schools, the biggest shareholders in education are parents and 
their children, whose future depend on the success of schools. The ultimate goal cannot 
be about boosting administrators’ political careers or egos, but instead about providing 
children with the equal education that is guaranteed under the United States Constitution.  
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